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Utilities and the Public R oadw ay - Ju st W hose Property is it, Anyway

State and County highway departments are constantly being approached by various
utilities for permission to locate utilities in public right of ways. Nearly all county roads, the
majority o f which were originally laid out on section lines, but also including those meandering
wagon roads, were never deeded to the county by the owners o f the real estate who owned the
property upon which the roads were located. And, in all but a few cases, no governmental entity
has ever condemned any property comprising these roads. Therefore, in nearly all cases
throughout unincorporated areas (and in some incorporated areas) a property owner owns to the
center o f a road.
Inasmuch as a great many of Indiana’s state highways consist of only improved county
roads, the maintenance o f which were taken over by the state from the counties in years gone by,
the ownership o f property abutting these roads is the same as county roads.
The question then arises, when a utility seeks permission o f a governmental entity to
locate its utilities in the public right o f way, just what is the “public right o f way,” and if the
governmental entity grants the utility its consent to locate utilities in a public right o f way; what is
the effect o f such a permit.
The courts of Indiana have consistently held that where a road runs through a landowner’s
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property, the landowner owns the road. However, such ownership is subject to the rights o f the
traveling public to use the road if said use has been open and notorious for the last twenty (20)
years. O f course this still does not answer the question, where the landowner’s title fails to
contain any grant of record or description o f the road, as to how much o f the landowner’s
property is subject to the rights o f the traveling public.
In determining how much of a landowner’s property is subject to a public right o f way,
where there has been no condemnation or grant which describes that right o f way, Indiana’s court
have consistently adopted a simple and straightforward rule. The public’s right o f way, and thus
the limits of any governmental entity’s permits given to utilities, is restricted to only that portion
o f the land which is “physically occupied by the road and no more.”
In Anderson v. City o f Huntington, 40 Ind.App. 130, 81 N.E. 223 (1907) in addressing
this issue the court stated:
That the Huntington and Goshen road is a public highway, and was a
public highway in front o f appellant’s property prior to the action of
the city o f Huntington in establishing Jefferson street thereon, cannot
be controverted. But its width and boundaries never having been
established and determined by any competent authority, or recorded
in any proper record, these boundaries must be determined by the use
by the public. The wav cannot be greater than the use. Where the
boundary lines of a road never have been established by any competent
authority, but the right of the public to travel over such road has been
established by continuous usage, the width o f such road is determined
by the width of such use. McCreery v. Fallis (1904), 162 Ind. 255;
Hart v. Trustees, etc. (1860). 15 Ind. 226: Board, etc., v. Huff 118831.
91 Ind. 333; Epler v. Niman (1854), 5 Ind. 459; Elliot, Roads and Sts.
(2d ed ), §§376-386.

As far back as anyone could remember, the east line o f said road,
as used by the public, had been defined by the fence along the west
side of appellant’s lot (emphasis supplied.)
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Anderson. 40 Ind.App at 133-134.
Epler v. Niman. 5 Ind. 459, 460 (1854), cited in Anderson, approved an instruction to the
jury which read as follows:
A road which by twenty years' use becomes a public highway is o f no
established width by law; but the width as used at the end o f twenty years
cannot legally be intruded upon by any one. (emphasis supplied)
McCreery v. Fallis. 162 Ind. 255, 67 N.E. 673 (1903) made it clear that the state could
not simply decree a wider width for a road right o f way than that which had been used by the
public for twenty years. A statute authorizing county commissioners to establish the width o f
prescriptive highways, “which width shall not be less than thirty feet,” was construed not to apply
to a road where “the way had only been used to a width varying from twenty-two to twenty-eight
feet.” 162 Ind at 256 (emphasis supplied). In McCreery the government contended:
That it was an intended legislative authority to ascertain, describe, and
enter o f record highways established by user, regardless of the extent
o f the user, and to fix the width thereof at not less than thirty feet” .
162 Ind at 257 (emphasis suppled).
The Supreme Court stated, at 162 Ind. 257:
We are forbidden the construction first above suggested, because, not
only in this case but in a large number o f cases, so to hold would be to
sanction the confiscation of property. . . .
Indiana courts have uniformly protected landowners from confiscation o f their property by
governmental entities attempts to widen roads beyond the limits of the public’s actual use. In
Elder v. Board o f County Comm’rs of Clark County. 490 N.E.2d 362 (Ind.App. 1986), where
there was “no evidence of any conveyance or condemnation, or o f documents to create, locate or
fix the width off the road, or o f any public usage of the road exceeding its previous 21 foot
width;” and after the county, without permission, took approximately 15 feet o f Elder’s yard and
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cut down trees and shrubs to widen the road, Elder sued in inverse condemnation. The trial court
ruled against him, stating that he had not proven the location o f his property boundaries. Elder.
490 N.E.2d at 363.
The court o f Appeals first noted, at 490 N.E.2d 363:
[T]here is no question that Elder owns the land in fee, though there is
a dispute as to the exact location o f its northern boundary. Thus,
the real issue is whether or not, at some point in time, the land was
properly appropriated by the County.
The Court then observed that the county admitted it had not condemned the land, but
claimed a 40 foot right o f way existed (whereas the road was 20 to 21 feet wide), based upon
evidence that the county’s engineer and the county surveyor thought the road, originally a private
turnpike, had a 40 foot right of way, and two unrecorded survey maps of other land crossed by
the same road indicated a 40 foot right o f way. 490 N.E.2d at 363-364.
The Court o f Appeals held that such evidence could not be a lawful basis for finding the
right o f way was wider than the road. The Court concluded:
Elder’s title may not be defeated by the evidence adduced by the County.
None o f that evidence was recorded in a proper record which would be
brought into Elder’s abstract as notice o f the County’s claim o f a 40
foot right o f way. A contrary ruling would drastically disturb settled
land titles. We further hold that the county owned only that land
physically occupied by the road and no more, (emphasis suppled)
490 N.E.2d at 365.
Occasional mowing of the berm or side ditches by a governmental entity does not extend
the use o f the “traveled way” to include the berm or side ditches.
In Board o f Comm’rs. of Monroe County v. Hatton 427 N.E.2d 696, (lnd.App. 1981)
there was evidence that the county had a policy o f mowing a strip about three feet wide alongside
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the road at least twice a year. The Court held that this maintenance work beyond the traveled
area was insufficient to overcome the basic rule, stating:
Where boundary lines have never been established by competent
authority, the width of the road established by use is limited to that
portion actually traveled and excludes any berm or shoulder.
Hatton. 427 N.E.2d at 699.
Thus, the court held, the county did not own (and was not responsible for) the weedy area
where a 14 year old bicyclist pulled off the road to wait for traffic to clear, even though he was a
user o f the road.
While the issue here involves utilities and the public roadway, as an aside, Hatton
poignantly illustrates the wisdom of the old adage that one should be careful what one asks for, it
may be granted. In Hatton, had the court ruled other than as it did, Monroe County could well
have had to pay for the injuries sustained by the bicyclist. Therefore, prior to a governmental
entity laying claim to all property between crop rows or fence rows on each side o f a road,
consideration should be given to the fact that with ownership of property comes responsibility and
legal accountability for injuries sustained on that property - and for environmental contaminations
which might be located there.
If a governmental entity chooses to permit a public utility (not a private utility) to locate
its improvements within the boundaries o f the traveled roadway, it clearly has the right to do so.
Colburn v. New Telephone Co.. 156 Ind. 90, 59 N.E. 324 (1901). Therefore, a permit issued by
the county or state to allow a utility to bore under a road is clearly effective with respect to the
width o f the traveled portion of the road. Likewise, a governmental entity would be within its
right to permit a public utility to place its utilities parallel with the road, so long as the same are
located on or in the traveled portion o f the road. Were the governmental entity to permit such
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acts however, the potential liability for people being injured as a consequence o f those acts is
staggering.
However, any such permit is ineffective as to that portion o f the landowner’s property
which lies outside the traveled way o f the public road and any such permit affords the utility no
refuge as shown by the latest Indiana case on this subject, Contel o f Indiana. Inc, v. Coulson. 659
N.E.2d 224(1995), attached.
In view o f recent technological advances which have resulted in utilities being desirous o f
burying fiber optic communication lines (some o f which produce millions o f dollars in revenue a
day) along side public roads, this issue is going to confront governmental entities more frequently
in the future. And, given: (1) the fact that Indiana law has consistently limited the definition o f a
public road, or public right o f way, only to the traveled portion o f the road, (2) the inherent
liability imposed on a landowner who might accidentally interrupt service o f the utility, (3) the
inherent burden such a utility imposes on future use and development o f the property and (4) the
constraints placed on both corporations and the government by Article 1, Section 21 o f Indiana’s
Constitution:
No person’s property shall be taken by law, without just compensation;
nor, except in the case of the State, without such compensation first
assessed and tendered.
governmental entities had better acquaint themselves with this body of law and act accordingly in
issuing permits to utilities.
Should a governmental entity choose to grant a utility a permit, this writer recommends
one similar to that used by the Morgan County Highway Commission, copy attached. Morgan
County’s permit provides for indemnification o f the county as well as requiring notice to adjoining
property owners by the utility which receives the permit.
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While the writer believes this paper represents an accurate and unbiased representation of
the state o f the law with respect to roads which have not been condemned or conveyed, the law is
not the same with respect to roads where the road is located on property obtained by
condemnation or conveyance As to those roads, any permit issued to a public utility by a
governmental entity would be effective, so long as the utilities are placed within the boundaries o f
the governmentally owned property. Fox v. Ohio Valley Gas Corporation, 250 Ind 111, 235
N.E.2d 168 (1968).
The writer wishes to further inform the reader that he currently and in the past has
represented landowners in various parts o f Indiana who are involved in litigation involving various
utilities, counties and the State of Indiana, where these matters have been or are being litigated.
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659 N.E.2d 224
C O N T EL O F INDIANA, INC., A ppellant-D efendant,
v.
Lee CO IJLSO N , Beverly Coulson and Zoe Coulson, Appellees-Plaintiffs.
No. 11A01-9503-CV-74.
Court o f Appeals o f Indiana.
Dec. 22, 1995.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 1996.
Property owners brought trespass action against telephone company, after company buried
fiber optic telephone cable adjacent to public roadway on owners' property under state permit.
Parties cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The Clay Circuit Court, Ernest E. Yelton, J.,
granted partial summary judgment for owners, concluding that state had no right-of-way or
easement beyond traveled portion of roadway. Company appealed. The Court o f Appeals,
Najam, J., held that: (1) state's right-of-way for state road over owners' property was coextensive
with road and did not extend to adjacent property, and (2) fact issue, as to whether and, if so,
where company might have acquired easement by prescription respecting its telephone lines in
areas outside state road on owners' property, precluded summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Contel o f Indiana, Inc. ("Contel") appeals from the trial court's grant o f partial summary
judgment in favor o f Lee Coulson, Beverly Coulson and Zoe Coulson (the "Coulsons") on the
Coulsons' complaint for trespass. The Coulsons filed suit against Contel after Contel buried fiber
optic telephone cable adjacent to a public roadway on property owned by the Coulsons. The
parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court
entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Coulsons and concluded, as a matter o f law, that
the State of Indiana has no right-of-way or easement beyond the traveled portion o f the roadway.
(FN1)
We affirm.
ISSUE
The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred when it held that
the State's right-of-way included only the traveled portion o f the road.
FACTS
The Coulsons own property in Sullivan County, the boundary o f which extends to the
center o f State Road 63, which was formerly a county road. No fee or easement for a
right-of-way was ever conveyed to the County or the State, but the motoring public has traveled
along the roadway for many years. The Indiana Department o f Transportation issued a permit to
Contel to lay telephone cable in the State Road 63 right-of-way. In its permit, the State did not
indicate the width o f the right-of-way. Contel dug trenches and buried approximately two and
one-half miles o f fiber optic telephone cable along the road in areas which at all times were
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beyond the paved roadway.
The Coulsons filed their complaint against Contel for trespass seeking compensatory and
punitive damages for Contel's conduct in burying the cable after the Coulsons had advised Contel
that they owned the property in question. Contel moved for partial summary judgment and
sought a ruling to determine the width o f the State Road 63 right-of-way. The Coulsons filed a
cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the State o f Indiana's
right-of-way easement over the Coulsons' property included only the traveled portion o f the road,
excluding any berm or shoulder and, thus, entered partial summary judgment in favor o f the
Coulsons. At Contel's request, and finding no just reason for delay, the trial court entered final
judgment on its entry of partial summary judgment. Contel now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Standard of Review
[ 1] [2] Summary judgment may be rendered upon less than all o f the issues or claims.
Ind Trial Rule 56(C). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
appellate court is required to apply the same standard applied by the trial court. Farm Equip.
Store, Inc. v. White Farm Equip. Co. (1992), Ind.App., 596 N.E.2d 274, 275. Summary
judgment is appropriate only if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter o f law.
Ind.Trial Rule 56(C); Lucas v. Stavos (1993), Ind.App., 609 N.E.2d 1114, 1116, trans. denied.
We resolve any doubt as to fact, or an inference to be drawn therefrom, in favor o f the
non-moving party. Gilliam v. Contractors United, Inc. (1995), Ind.App., 648 N.E.2d 1236,
1238, trans. denied.
[3] The fact that both parties request summary judgment does not alter our standard of
review. Laudig v. Marion County Bd o f Voters Registration (1992), Ind.App., 585 N.E.2d 700,
704. Rather, "we must separately consider each motion to determine whether there is a genuine
issue o f material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Id
Right-of-Way
[4] Contel contends the trial court erred when it entered partial summary judgment in
favor o f the Coulsons. Specifically, Contel argues that the court erroneously concluded that the
State's right-of-way covered only the traveled portion o f the road, excluding the land adjacent to
the paved road. We cannot agree.
[5] State Road 63 is a former county road, the maintenance o f which was assumed by the
State many years ago. No public easement or right-of-way over the Coulsons' property has ever
been conveyed by instrument or acquired by condemnation. As with most county roads, the
property rights o f abutting landowners extend to the center of the roadway subject only to an
easement of the public to use the street or highway. See Gorby v. McEndarfer (1963), 135
Ind.App. 74, 82, 191 N.E.2d 786, 791 (citing Street, Indiana Title to Real Property, § 789). The
Coulsons do not dispute that the State has a public road right-of-way over a portion of their
property. The parties disagree, however, on the extent o f that right-of-way.
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Since there is no record indicating that the State has acquired a right-of-way over the
Coulsons' property by purchase or condemnation, Indiana law dictates that the State Road 63
right-of-way must be determined by public use. In Anderson v. City o f Huntington (1907), 40
Ind App 130, 81 N.E. 223, our supreme court recognized that the public right-of-way "cannot be
greater than the use" and stated:
Where the boundary lines of a road have never been established by any competent authority, but
the right o f the public to travel over such road has been established by continuous usage, the
width o f such road is determined by the width o f such use.
Id. at 133, 81 N.E. at 224; see Evans v. Bowman (1915), 183 Ind. 264,267, 108 N.E.
956, 958. More recently, this court has recognized that the width o f a road established by use is
limited to that portion actually traveled and excludes any berm or shoulder. Bd. of Comm'rs o f
Monroe County v. Hatton (1981), Ind.App., 427 N.E.2d 696, 699. In Hatton, the plaintiff
sought to establish that the County either owned or had assumed responsibility to maintain an area
adjacent to a county road and had a corresponding common law duty in negligence in connection
with the land. We noted that neither a record o f county ownership o f the adjacent areas nor any
legal description o f the road itself could be found, "which is a common situation for highways
established by use." Id. at 699. Thus, we determined that there was no evidence to support a
reasonable inference o f County ownership or responsibility for the areas adjacent to the traveled
portion o f the roadway. Id.
Similar to the present case, in Elder v. Bd. o f County Comm'rs o f Clark County (1986),
Ind App., 490 N.E.2d 362, trans. denied, a landowner sued the County in inverse condemnation.
The County had cut down trees and shrubs on the plaintiffs property adjacent to a public road in
an attempt to widen the paved roadway from approximately 20 feet to 40 feet. The County
asserted it had a 40 foot right-of-way in the area despite the fact that the width o f the paved road
had always been 20 feet. In Elder, we noted the longstanding Indiana precedent that the width o f
the right-of-way is determined by the public use. Id. at 364; Anderson, at 133, 81 N.E. at 224;
McCreery v. Fallis (1903), 162 Ind 255, 67 N.E. 673; Bd o f Comm'rs v. Huff (1883), 91 Ind.
333; Hart v. Trustees (1860), 15 Ind. 226; Epler v. Niman (1854), 5 Ind. 459. Although the
County produced the testimony of the county surveyor and several survey maps in support of its
claimed right-of-way, we held that the evidence presented by the County was insufficient as none
was recorded in a proper record which would be brought into the landowner's abstract as notice
o f the County's claim o f a 40 foot right-of-way. Elder, 490 N.E.2d at 365. We decided that a
contrary ruling would drastically disturb settled land titles. Id. (FN2)
Here, we agree with the trial court and conclude that the State Road 63 right-of-way is
coextensive with the paved roadway. There is no evidence to show that the public has ever
"traveled" on the land adjacent to the roadway. See Hatton, 427 N.E.2d at 699. Neither the
State nor the County has ever acquired a right-of-way to property adjacent to the roadway by
conveyance or condemnation, and no additional right-of-way has been acquired by use. No
markers have ever been placed on the Coulsons' property to show that the State claimed a
right-of-way beyond the pavement. Indeed, when it granted Contel the permit to bury telephone
lines, the State did not indicate the actual extent o f its right-of-way. The State merely granted
Contel permission to bury its telephone cable within the public road right-of-way, which we have
determined includes only the paved road.
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[6] Still, Contel, a public utility which provides telephone service, maintains that the use
o f modern fiber optic cable creates a common good and that the State's grant o f authority to
Contel was sufficient to allow its utility installation along State Road 63. Contel cites several
Indiana cases in support o f its position, each of which is distinguishable from the instant case in
that, the utility or governmental entity had established an easement or right-of-way over the
property in question. In its argument, Contel circumvents the central issue of this appeal by
assuming that its actions were done within the public right-of-way and with authority o f the State.
Where a fee is already subject to an easement for highway purposes, a utility may use a public
right-of-way without the consent o f the servient landowner who claims that such utility work is an
additional burden on the fee. Ritz v. Indiana and Ohio R.R. (1994), Ind.App., 632 N.E.2d 769,
775, trans. denied. Here, however, the public right-of-way extends only to the paved roadway.
Contel received from the State's permit only those rights which the State had and no more.
Therefore, Contel could not have obtained from the State, without the Coulsons' consent,
authority to bury its cable beyond the traveled portion o f State Road 63.
Finally, Contel asserts that the Coulsons have specifically recognized that the State has an
easement beyond that o f the roadway. Contel argues that the Coulsons have failed to object to
prior acts by the State in mowing and maintaining the shoulder areas along the road on their
property. The State's authority and responsibility to maintain public roads gives rise to an
occasional need to enter the property adjacent to the traveled roadway to mow and to maintain
ditches and culverts. Its authority, however, is not derived from an easement or right-of-way.
Rather, the State's authority is based on an implied license to enter the land for a limited purpose.
[7] [8] [9] Unlike an easement or right-of-way, a license merely confers a personal
privilege to do some act or acts on land without conveying an estate in the land See Industrial
Disposal v. City of East Chicago (1980), Ind.App., 407 N.E.2d 1203, 1205. While an easement
possesses the qualities o f inheritability and assignability, these qualities are generally inconsistent
with a license. Id Further, use o f land under a mere license cannot ripen into an easement,
regardless o f how long that use is continued. Greenco, Inc. v. May (1987), Ind.App., 506
N.E.2d 42, 46. The occasional, intermittent entry by the State on the property adjacent to the
roadway merely to maintain areas appurtenant to the roadway did not establish a public
right-of-way in those areas.
Based on the undisputed facts, we conclude that the State Road 63 right-of-way as
established by public use extends only to the paved portion of the roadway. The trial court's
partial summary judgment was correct on the issue presented by the cross-motions o f the parties.
However, a determination o f the width of the State's right-of-way does not necessarily resolve the
issue o f whether Contel had an independent prescriptive right to bury its long distance cable on
the Coulsons' property.
Prescriptive Easement
[10] [11] [12] A prescriptive easement is established by actual, open, notorious,
continuous, uninterrupted, adverse use for 20 years under a claim of right, or by continuous
adverse use with the knowledge and acquiescence o f the servient landowner. See IND.CODE §
32-5-1-1; Bauer v. Harris (1993), Ind.App., 617N .E.2d 923, 927. We agree with the Coulsons
that the presence o f other utilities in the area adjacent to the road does not establish an easement
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in favor o f Contel. A prescriptive easement is limited to the purpose for which it is created and
cannot be extended by implication. Id. at 931. However, it is undisputed that Contel had
previously buried local telephone lines between State Road 63 and the Coulsons' fence or crop
line prior to Contel's action of burying the fiber optic long distance lines. (FN3) Although the
Coulsons maintain that they do not object to the local lines, in determining whether Contel has a
prescriptive easement, we decline to recognize a distinction between its local cable and long
distance cable.
It is unclear from the record how long the Contel local lines have existed on the Coulsons'
property or the exact location o f the local lines in relation to the new fiber optic cable. (FN4) At
trial, it remains to be determined whether or not Contel or its predecessor in interest acquired a
prescriptive easement for telephone lines over any part o f the Coulsons' property.
We affirm the trial court's entry o f partial summary judgment on the issue o f the width o f
the State Road 63 right-of-way, noting, however, that genuine issues o f material fact remain for
trial concerning whether and, if so, where Contel may have acquired an easement by prescription.
Affirmed
BAKER and GARRARD, JJ„ concur
FN1. We heard oral argument on November 28, 1995, at Indiana State University in Terre
Haute.
FN2. In Elder, this court further held that the County owned only that land physically occupied
by the road and no more. Id at 365. We note that in Elder, unlike here, the landowner's
property line did not extend to the center of the roadway. He had significantly fewer rights than
do the Coulsons as he owned only that land lying south o f the southern edge o f the road.
FN3. The record also shows that Contel replaced some of the old local lines at the same time as it
was burying the long distance lines.
FN4. The Coulsons assert that while Contel placed its long distance lines next to the pre-existing
local line in some areas, in other areas the long distance cable is not even on the same side o f
State Road 63 as the pre-existing lines.
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